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POETICS
Barrett Watten
The Poetics of Information
Overload: From Gertrude Stein
to Conceptual Writing by Paul
Stephens. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2015. 240 +
xvi pp. Paperback: $25.00

I have nearly unlimited
access to music; I can audiorecord my entire day; I can
record high-definition video
and send it wirelessly. There
are over forty thousand messages in my Gmail inbox.
The world’s major newspapers are continually updated
by the minute. Thanks to
my mobile web browser, I
have access to more words
than were contained in the
National Library of Ireland
on June 16, 1904. On that
day, Leopold Bloom carried
the following items in his
pocket. (ix)
What do we mean by information?
How can we discuss its poetics—
the discourse of the making of art
or writing as its condition of possibility? There are three distinct
uses of the term at work in Paul
Stephens’s revisionist history of
the American avant-garde tradition. Stephens’s baseline narrative
is the pervasive sense of being overwhelmed that we live and suffer on
a daily basis, readily identifiable in
the quotation above and reflected
in the covers of self-help publications with titles such as Surviving
Information Overload, Information
Anxiety, and Overload! How Too
Much Information Is Hazardous
to Your Organization (xii–xiii). A
second narrative begins with modernism’s imitation of information
surplus, represented by the list of
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random items in Leopold Bloom’s
pocket, continuing through the textual experiments of Gertrude Stein
and the avant-garde “Revolution of
the Word” of the 1930s, and ending at a point of convergence with
conceptual art and writing, from
the 1960s to now. As initial premise, Stephens wants to show how
modernism and the avant-garde
in its development recognized,
contested, transformed, and made
something new out of the technological development of what has
been called, from the 1950s on, the
“information society.” The two
narratives of development parallel
and support each other, in a continuous present of technological
determinism: the increasing tendency toward ever-greater information resources as a consequence
of the media and technology that
create and access them and the parallel development of avant-garde
forms that represent or reflect on
surplus information. Stephens’s
focus on the avant-garde—despite
disparities of scale between big data
or mass media and the elusive and
inaccessible works of individuals
and coteries—is his overarching
claim: that works of experimental
art and literature provide the best
register, and potential remedy for,
the condition in which we live:
“Although information technology
has typically been figured as hostile or foreign to poetry, . . . avantgarde poetry has been centrally
concerned with technologies of

communication, data storage, and
bureaucratic control—not simply
rejecting those technologies, but
also adopting and commenting on
them” (1).
Innovations of modernist and
avant-garde poetics thus intersect
with information in ways that produce a proliferation of forms that
reflect on, as they counteract, this
overload. But here the question is
precisely how the convergence of
poetic form and what Mark Poster
termed “the mode of information”
takes place. At the basis of this
question is what is meant by “information” and even more specifically
its relation to the language that
embodies it. Mediated processes of
storage and retrieval are anything
but neutral to the information—or
the knowledge and language—
they represent. At the intersection
of information and poetics is a set
of parallel but also negative conditions in which, for Poster, “the representational function of language
has been placed in question by the
differential communicational patterns each of which shift to the
forefront the self-referential aspect
of language.”1 Rendering a form
of knowledge—for example, the
catalogue of the National Library
of Ireland—into information (the
card catalogue that accesses it)
transforms the library’s content
into something entirely different,
a differential system that turns its
content into a formalized set of
metadata.

ON THE POETICS OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD
For Ron Day, the modern invention of information is thus a politically and culturally invested process
that leads to social “command and
control,” on the one hand, along
with the illusion of an equivalence
and transparency of information
in its major forms, on the other:
“Information and communication
technologies are not just representational or ‘virtual’ at the level
of presenting visual or auditory
simulacra; they themselves may
constitute instances of representation or virtuality insofar as they are
substitutional or tropic figurations
that mediate the future both technologically and semiotically.”2 The
concept of “information overload”
depends on such large-scale figurations, in ways that obscure or overwrite the relation of information
to the objects of knowledge or language it represents. “Information”
is thus a differential rather than a
positive term, as it produces a form
of representation—metadata, code,
or language—that strips the object
of knowledge from its manner of
indexical organization. In order
to access fully the potential relationship of forms of poetry and
art to information, then, the poetics of information itself must be
described, not in the metaphor of
a “mass of data” but in the precise
constitution of its elements.
The third narrative of information poetics, then, must be that
which comprehends the specificity of both terms. Information
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in this sense reflects the development of information theory, after
its primary instance in Claude
Shannon and Warren Weaver’s
The Mathematical Theory of
Communication
(1948).
For
Shannon and Weaver, information is the radical stripping of content (the message to be conveyed)
from its mode of communication,
reduced to a measure representing
the probability of its being received
as message as its quantity of information. The mathematics of quantifying information as probability
led Shannon and Weaver to reduce
information to its minimal unit, the
bit or binary digit, from which as
we know all computer languages
and digital media are now built.
Reducing information to minimal
units is provisionally a radical formalism in which meaning, message, or content are elided for their
greater technological capacity for
being transmitted and received.
However, even at the basic level of
the construction of information as
a probabilistic calculation of minimal units or bits, there is a payoff
for a politics of information overload in a positive as well as negative
sense: “The concept of information
applies not to the individual messages (as the concept of meaning
would), but rather to the situation
as a whole, the unit information
indicating that in this situation one
has an amount of freedom of choice,
in selecting a message, which it is
convenient to regard as a standard
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or unit amount.”3 The radical particularity of the bit, then, implies a
horizon of freedom of choice that
works through the probability of
transmission to the meaning, message, or content that may be located
through it (a freedom that may
refer to post–World War II repudiations of totalitarian systems of
meaning, Stalinist or fascist, that
restrict “freedom of choice”).
Katherine Hayles, in How
We Became Posthuman, develops another line from the radical formalism of the bit and its
consequent dematerialization of
content, seeing the relationship
between information and meaning in the digital age to be the result
of the persistence of immateriality
within material forms as what she
terms “virtuality”: “From ATMs
to the Internet, from the morphing programs used in Terminator
II to the sophisticated visualization
programs used to guide microsurgeries, information is increasingly
perceived as interpenetrating material forms. . . . From here it is a small
step to perceiving information as
more mobile, more important,
more essential than material forms.
When this impression becomes
part of your cultural mindset, you
have entered the condition of virtuality.”4 Hayles’s derivation of
“virtuality” leads from media technology to the fantasmatic fiction
and “information narratives” she
reads, in which information and
materiality combine and “data are

thus humanized, and subjectivity
is computerized, allowing them to
join in a symbiotic union whose
result is narrative.”5
But it may equally be the abstract
“freedom of choice,” not merely the
perception of informatic patterning, that results from the stripping
of content to bits that is most crucial
for an information poetics. Here,
the radical particularity of the bit
suggests a relationship to the ubiquitous formal device of the nonnarrative foregrounding of the part
within a larger whole that we find
everywhere in works of the avantgarde, from Marcel Duchamp
and William Carlos Williams to
Language and conceptual writing.6 Poets and conceptual artists,
in a way entirely different from the
virtual fantasies of cyber- or postmodern fiction, exploit the tension
between abstract information and
its material embodiment in alternative forms. A central strength of
Stephens’s Poetics of Information
Overload, then, is not merely to
draw a technologically determined
parallel between information society and the avant-garde but to
show how a series of nonnarrative forms, which foreground both
materiality and particularity, intersect with the technological series in
ways that do not simply reproduce
it. The history of avant-garde formal innovation will not necessarily
be progressive, teleological, or even
consistent. Rather, it shows how the
forms of the avant-garde provide

ON THE POETICS OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD
ways of comprehending the vastness and abstraction of information while not simply succumbing
to it—although here an objection
may be raised of the avant-garde’s
self-reflexive textualization, a position taken by Paul Mann in his The
Theory Death of the Avant-Garde
(1991).7 But in positive terms, the
avant-garde produces forms of
“know-that” in terms of information society that are also forms of
“know-how”: the specific poetics of
the avant-garde text itself as a form
of agency. In showing how to avoid
a “becoming virtual” that dissolves
us into an overwhelming mass of
data, avant-garde forms are important precisely because they rematerialize what has been stripped
from the knowledge and content
of information. Their materiality and radical particularity thus
counter the overstretched claims of
simple technological determinism
made by certain conceptual writers; the avant-garde rematerializes
that which has been dematerialized and thus provides a form of
poetic self-reflexivity as “what to
make” of information. Arguing
with a certain cultural studies pessimism associated with the work of
Friedrich Kittler, who opines that
“under conditions of high technology, literature has nothing more
to say. It ends in cryptograms that
defy interpretation and permit only
interception,” Stephens responds,
“Against Kittler’s pronouncement,
poetries of information overload
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. . . demonstrate an extraordinary
range of innovation responses to
technological conditions” (36).8
Everything in such an argument for rematerialization and
particularity depends on the
example. Stephens’s avant-garde
texts are both recognizable to the
cognoscenti of the avant-garde
and surprising for their consistent
“responses to technological conditions.” An opening paradigm
for information overload in the
modernist period must surely be
Gertrude Stein’s 926-page The
Making of Americans (1926), a text
often seen as unreadable due to
the sheer “wall of words” it presents. Stephens sees The Making
of Americans as anything but the
compendious archive (after Jacques
Derrida’s Archive Fever) that many
readers find it to be, of “everyone
who ever was or will be living”;
rather, it is a form of mediation and
rematerialization that supplants
abstract patterns of modern social
organization with the human insistence of her characters’ “bottom
natures,” the facticity of their being
that is not reducible to pattern.
Even when David Hersland dies,
thus entering the world of mere
data, his death requires hundreds of
pages of material text.9 Stein’s modern epic is framed, by Stephens,
through her dismissal—in her 1946
essay “Reflections on the Atomic
Bomb”—of the technological sublime, which she famously found to
be “not interesting.” Whereas the
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abstract informatics of technology
do not compel her, she produces an
information text of her own order.
Such a DIY response to information overload is similarly evident in a slightly later, idiosyncratic
project, the American expatriate
poet Bob Brown’s “Readies,” in
which he writes texts to be read
and reproduced through machinic
processes, much like contemporary
ticker tape would reproduce stock
prices. Brown’s Readie machine,
while predicting technology to
come, is also a homemade folly that
both symptomatizes and ironically
undermines information overload.
For Stephens, “The dream of the
reading machine is cybernetic. . . .
The reading machine counters the
entropic decay of local languages by
means of something like Maxwell’s
demon of reading, a demon who
implants ideas directly into the
brain of the globalized reader” (75).
The ludic and even parodic impact
of Brown’s project—its “hyperbolic
boosterism” (75)—saves it from
sheer technological determinism,
on the one hand, and keeps it from
being an instance of an as-yet-tocome virtuality, on the other.
The modernist responses to
information overload were written
or imagined during a period when
modernity was dominant but the
forms of information society were
not yet in place. With Charles
Olson and later conceptual writers,
however, reflection on the development of information theory

and cybernetics is readable in the
forms and texts of the postmodern.
Olson’s “The Kingfishers” (1949)
prominently displays a quote from
Norbert Weiner’s Cybernetics
(1948): “And what is the message? The message is / a discrete
or continuous sequence of measurable events distributed in time,”10
from about the time Olson invited
Weiner onto the board of Black
Mountain College. Two aspects
of information theory and cybernetics are important for Olson:
first, the project of an epic poem
that organizes a vast archive of
cultural information; and second,
one that does so through forms of
self-organization and autopoiesis
that are irreducible to modernist
forms of rational organization and
knowledge retrieval. In countering modernity with poetic forms
of cybernetic self-organization,
Olson attempts to substitute the
body of the poet as continuous with
the world of things for the dissociation of subject-centered reason.
Stephens notes, “As a model for
the acquisition of knowledge, proprioception insists on an immediacy of engagement between mind
and body, body and polis, as well
as body and planet” (105). The
ultimate tragedy of Olson’s failure
to realize this immediacy—at the
limit of his physical body—underscores his difference from and
contestation of the merely technological dimensions of cybernetics.
What survives is Olson’s material

ON THE POETICS OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD
text, not the occasion of its making (in the sense of Alfred North
Whitehead’s concepts of “occasion” and “event”).
The spectacular failure of immanence in Olson’s poetics, however,
led in the next decades to more
restricted, procedural experiments
in rematerializing information.
While the forms of art and writing
that developed in early conceptual
art had their origins primarily in
questions about the nature of art
after the turn to abstract painting
and pop art, an as-yet-unremarked
series of writers—from John Cage
to Bern Porter, Hannah Weiner,
and Bernadette Mayer and others—
explored forms of textual materiality that, in retrospect, seem strongly
motivated to reflect the excesses of
information. Both the Information
show at the Museum of Modern
Art (1970) and Lucy Lippard’s Six
Years: The Dematerialization of the
Art Object . . . (1973) exhibit the
turn to information as a central feature of conceptual art and writing.11
Again, the material specificity of
these projects counters the abstract
formalism of information with
texts that are often irreducible,
unparaphrasable,
intractable—
anything but data to be absorbed
in machinic forms of storage and
retrieval. Work of this period, for
this reason, continues to inspire artists and writers to explore textual
forms that seem to perpetuate the
informational sublime but in fact
rematerialize it.
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Stephens ends his genealogy of
the avant-garde with Language
and conceptual writing—the two
movements that arguably gave him
the framework for his series to begin
with. The texts of Language writing, without question, often imitate
or negotiate a vastness of scale of
information that approaches the
vastness of “language” itself, seen
as a limit of the knowable and representable. It is this convergence,
then, of the medium of language
with anything represented in it
that creates both support for and a
contrary movement to Stephens’s
argument. In two of the narratives
of information presented above—
of the parallel developments of
technology and literary forms—we
witness a progressive development
of storage and transmission capacity toward ever greater (and more
frightening) horizons. The turn to
language—unlike the unrestricted
embodiment of “open field”
poetry—creates a formal limit to
informational vastness by the adoption of language as its operative
principle. Otherwise put, Language
writing seems not to worry about
the information explosion because
no amount of mere data could ever
equal the combinatorial infinity of
language itself. In the period of its
emergence, Language writing registered many aspects of the digital
culture to come, particularly the
influence of algorithmic and computational procedures on formal
strategies. Many Language writers
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took jobs in the emerging cyber
industry and have had careers
there as much as in academia (a
fact not sufficiently registered in its
reception). But it is arguable that
Language writing, across its many
instances, did not seek to imitate or
counter the development of digital
media or information retrieval or
the internet.
It is notable, then, that conceptual writers, concerned to distance
themselves from the radical particularity of Language writing,
claimed a technological determinism in advance of their own formal
innovations. As well, the notion
that conceptual writing need not
be read but only comprehended
for its procedures has had a curiously dematerializing impact on
its otherwise massive texts—the
prime example of which would be
Kenneth Goldsmith’s retyping of
one day’s edition of the New York
Times, republished as the massive
material text Day (2003).12 A narrative of dematerialization—quite
the opposite of the rematerialization
evident in the genealogy from Stein
to Language writing—suggests the
possibility of an alternative politics:
not a distancing comprehension of
information overload but a seamless absorption into it. It is for this
reason that this reader was gratified
to see The Poetics of Information
Overload conclude with a discussion of the ur–Language writer
Robert Grenier’s hand-drawn
texts: the ultimate instance of

antitechnological Luddism: regressive, intractable works of idiosyncratic genius that have since been
scanned, digitized, archived, and
made widely available online.
Paul Stephens’s contribution to
the theory of the avant-garde is to
show how these poets and visual
artists, in their strategies of radical
particularity and rematerialization, reclaim agency in the face of
information overload—rather than
be absorbed seamlessly into mighty
clouds of virtuality.
Barrett Watten is a professor of English at
Wayne State University and a member of
its Academy of Scholars. He is the author
of The Constructivist Moment: From
Material Text to Cultural Poetics (winner of
the 2004 René Wellek Prize) and Questions
of Poetics: Language Writing and
Consequences (University of Iowa Press,
2016), as well as many volumes of poetry.
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